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Summary
In cost-utility analysis, the numbers of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained are aggregated according to
the sum-ranking (or QALY maximisation) rule. This requires that the social value from health improvements
is a simple product of gains in quality of life, length of life and the number of persons treated. The results from
a systematic review of the literature suggest that QALY maximisation is descriptively ﬂawed. Rather than being
linear in quality and length of life, it would seem that social value diminishes in marginal increments of both.
And rather than being neutral to the characteristics of people other than their propensity to generate QALYs, the
social value of a health improvement seems to be higher if the person has worse lifetime health prospects and higher
if that person has dependents. In addition, there is a desire to reduce inequalities in health. However, there are some
uncertainties surrounding the results, particularly in relation to what might be aﬀecting the responses, and there is
the need for more studies of the general public that attempt to highlight the relative importance of various key
factors. Copyright
Introduction
Cost-utility analysis (CUA) seeks to provide
health care policy-makers with information on
the health beneﬁts associated with alternative
resource allocation decisions. Health beneﬁts in
CUA are measured in terms of the number of
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained. The
QALY is a combination of the value of the health
states and their duration, and every QALY is
equivalent to one year of life in full health. In
CUA, the numbers of QALYs gained are aggre-
gated across individual patients according to the
sum-ranking (or QALY maximisation) rule. This
requires that the social value from health improve-
ments is a simple product of gains in quality of life,
length of life and the number of persons treated.
In this paper, we consider the results of a
methodological review of the literature concerning
the de facto standard in CUA that the sole
objective of health care is to maximise the number
of QALYs gained, irrespective of who those
QALYs go to and how they are distributed across
society. The objective of the review is to search for
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studies where diﬀerent ways in which the descrip-
tive validity of this de facto standard is examined.
We then seek to draw some general patterns that
emerge from the data and to suggest where future
research eﬀorts might be directed. In what follows,
we describe the basis of QALY maximisation and
present the questions addressed in the review. Next
we describe the literature search and some
descriptive data on the papers reviewed. Subse-
quent sections open with the theoretical literature
on each item, and then report the evidence from
the review. Finally, we discuss some of the
problems with interpreting the results and the
implications of the results for future empirical
research.
QALYmaximisation
In the simplest case, with no uncertainty and
no changes in health over time, an individual’s
health gain from treatment, QALYG, can be
represented as
QALYG ¼ T1Q1  T0Q0 ð1aÞ
where T is the number of years, Q represents
health state values, and the subscripts 1 and 0
represent health with and without treatment,
respectively. Accounting for uncertainly, this
becomes
QALYG ¼ ShStp1htQht  ShStp0htQht ð1bÞ
where p1ht and p0ht represent the probabilities of an
individual ﬁnding himself in health state h in time
period t with and without treatment, respectively.
Qht is the value of health state h at time t. The
number of consecutive periods spent in any given
state corresponds to the duration element, T in
Equation (1a). So, this is the QALY model
representing individual beneﬁt from treatment. In
order to compare interventions that are expected
to beneﬁt diﬀerent numbers of people in diﬀerent
ways, this QALY model will usually be (although
it does not have to be) incorporated into an
algorithm that implies QALY maximisation. As-
sume there are individuals i, j,. . ., each with a
probability phti of being in state h at time t. Then
the sum of p across the relevant population, Si phti,
will be equivalent to the expected number of
people being in state h at time t; that is, nht. (This
procedure allows for phti=phtj, but requires the
assumption Qhti=Qhtj, where j=i.) The expected
health gain from the intervention can then be
expressed as
Aggregated QALYG
¼ ShStn1htQht  ShStn0htQht ð2Þ
For this formula to accurately represent the
social value associated with health care interven-
tions all of the relevant parameters must have
interval scale properties; that is, social value must
be linear in n, as well as linear in Q and T.
Linearity in n includes anonymity, since so long as
there are n people in state h at time t, it does not
matter who these people are. In other words, the
algorithm does not distinguish between health
gains to individuals i and j. Economists who allow
for interpersonal comparisons of welfare typically
aggregate beneﬁts according to the sum-ranking
rule, which, by implication, assumes linearity in all
of the elements in Equation (2).
The question that lies at the heart of this paper
is the extent to which people’s preferences depart
from the assumption of linearity inherent in
Equation (2). Therefore, we conducted a literature
review that sought to shed light on the following
ﬁve questions:
1. Is social value a linear function of changes in
quality and length of life?
2. Is social value independent of the age of the
recipient?
3. Is social value independent of other character-
istics?
4. Is social value unaﬀected by inequalities in
health?
5. Is social value independent of how a ﬁxed gain
is distributed?
The literature review
The literature search was based on a ‘citation pearl
growing’ method [1]. This is an alternative search
strategy suitable for methodological reviews,
where the more conventional keyword based
search strategies may result in a very large number
of irrelevant references. A set of core references
need to be identiﬁed as the ‘initial’ references,
and based on these the ﬁrst wave of searches
looks for papers where this core literature has
been cited, the next wave looks for papers
where those identiﬁed and included from the ﬁrst
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wave have been cited, and so on, until no further
papers are identiﬁed. This was undertaken
using the citation search facility of the Institute
of Scientiﬁc Information (ISI) citation indexes
and through reference list searching. These data-
bases cover the science (including biomedical
science), social sciences (including economics)
and arts and humanities literature. The search
was restricted to papers in the English language,
dated 2001 or earlier.
First, 129 relevant ‘initial’ references were
identiﬁed from a review of equity in economic
evaluations [2] and from the authors’ own collec-
tions. Three rounds of searches generated a total
of 1739 additional references. Any paper that
either allows inferences to be drawn about the
relative weight that ought to be given to the
health gain of one group or individual vis- "a-vis
another, or discuss these issues theoretically was
eligible for inclusion in the review. In addition,
given the methodological nature of the review,
where a theoretical issue of general interest in
health care was discussed in specialist medical
journals for educational purposes these were
usually excluded. Finally, when an author uses
similar data to address the same question above,
we have included only the main paper by that
author. A total of 247 references were selected on
the basis of the title and the abstract and 78 were
included in the ﬁnal review, 64 of which have
empirical data.
Table 1 summarises the 64 studies in the
review that report empirical data. It shows
that the studies that have looked at QALY
maximisation have mostly asked respondents
to self-complete a questionnaire. Many studies
have asked questions of a random sample of
the general public, with samples often in excess
of 100. However, there are still a few studies
that have used relatively small convenience
samples. The majority of studies have been carried
out in the UK, followed by Europe and North
America.
This is a methodological review and, in
presenting the results, we have made no attempt
to assess the quality of empirical studies. We will
simply draw readers’ attention to particular
aspects of the study design (such as the sample
size and composition and the country of origin)
from which their own judgements about the
quality and relevance of the data can be made
but in discussing we will be a little more
prescriptive.
Is social value a linear function of
changes in quality and length of life?
Harris warns that QALY maximisation may lead
to unacceptable discrimination against the elderly,
the inﬁrm, and other vulnerable groups in society
with lower than average capacity to beneﬁt from
treatment [3]. To Harris, provided that the patient
wishes to go on living, each life should be valued
equally irrespective of how much is left. Whilst it is
one thing to say that the size of the beneﬁt is not
the only thing that matters, it is another thing
entirely to say, as Harris does, that it should not
matter at all. People may quite reasonably be
interested in diﬀerences in health without treat-
ment as well as in the beneﬁts from treatment. Two
recent Norwegian commissions on priority setting
in health care have identiﬁed that an important
rationale for government involvement in health
care is to provide beneﬁt to those with the worst
health prospects [4].
In general terms, and across a range of decision
contexts, the empirical evidence currently available
suggests that people are willing to sacriﬁce quality
of life gains in order to give priority to the most
severely ill [5–7]. Comparing improvements in
health that start at diﬀerent levels of severity but
are equal in size, Nord reports a preference for
movements starting at lower levels over equidi-
stant improvements starting at higher levels [8].
Dolan asked respondents to trade oﬀ severity of
the initial condition, with the size of health gain
and found a move from 0.2 to 0.4 was equivalent
to 0.4 to 0.8 [9]. Ubel replicated Nord’s study and
obtained similar results in that people wanted to
give greater priority to those who were most
severely ill [10]. However, when he provided
clariﬁcation of the consequences of their choice,
only 6% of respondents chose to allocate
resources to the very ill patient. When the question
was framed in terms of self-interest, the number
rose to 12%.
In the context of liver transplantation, Ubel and
Loewenstein show that only a small minority of
respondents chose to give all the organs to the
better-prognosis group [11]. However, the larger
the prognostic diﬀerences between patients, the
less likely respondents were to give all patients an
equal chance of receiving the organs (also see
[12,13]). Ubel and colleagues found that subjects
placed equal importance on saving the lives of
people with pre-existing paraplegia as compared to
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Table 1. Empirical references
Author(s) Year Design Sample Sample size Country of study
Abellan–Perpinan and Pinto-Prades 1999 2 3 3 3
Anand and Wailoo 2000 1 1 3 1
Andersson and Lyttkens 1999 2 3 3 3
Block et al. 2001 5 1 3 2
Bowling 1996 3 1 4 1
Browning and Thomas 2001 1 1 3 4
Busschbach et al. 1993 3 1, 3 2 3
Charny et al. 1989 1 1 3 1
Choudhry et al. 1997 2 4 3 1
Cookson and Dolan 1999 5 1 2 1
Cropper et al. 1994 6 1 4 2
Cuadras-Morato et al. 2001 2 3 4 3
Dolan 1998 2 3 2 1
Dolan and Cookson 2000 5 1 2 1
Dolan et al. 1999 5 1 3 1
Dolan and Green 1998 3 4 1 1
Dolan and Robinson 2001 2 3 3 1
Dolan and Tsuchiya 2002 3 1 3 1
Dolan et al. 2002 3 1 3 1
Edwards et al. 1999 1 1, 4 4 1
Emmelin et al. 1999 1 4 2 3
Furnham et al. 2000 5 3 3 1
Holmes 1997 2 3 3 2
Johannesson and Gerdtham 1996 4 3 4 3
Johanesson and Johansson 1996 6 1 4 3
Johanesson and Johansson 1997 6 1 4 3
Kneeshaw 1999 1 1 4 1
Kuder and Roeder 1995 5 1 2 3
Lewis and Charny 1989 1 1 3 1
Lindholm et al. 1996 1 4 2 3
Lindholm et al. 1997 1 4 2 3
Lindholm et al. 1998 1 4 2 3
Lindholm and Rosen 1998 1 4 3 3
Mooney et al. 1995 2 4 3 4
Neuberger et al. 1998 1, 3 1, 4 3 1
Nord 1993a 3 4 1 3
Nord 1993b 2 4 2 3
Nord 1995 2 1 1 3
Nord et al. 1995a 2 1 3 4
Nord et al. 1996 3 1 2 4
Olsen 1994 2 3 3 3
Olsen 2000 1 1 4 3
Ratcliﬀe 2000 2 4 3 1
Roberts et al. 1997 3 1 2 1
Rodriguez and Pinto 2000 4 3 2 3
Rodriguez and Pinto 2002 4 3 2 3
Shmueli 1999 3 1 4 5
Skitka and Tetlock 1992 2 3 3 2
Tsuchiya 2001 3 2 2 5
Tsuchiya et al. 2003 3 1 3 1
Ubel 1999 2 2 3 2
Ubel and Loewenstein 1995 2 2 3 2
Ubel and Loewenstein 1996a 2 2 3 2
Ubel and Loewenstein 1996b 2 2 3 2
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those who could be returned to perfect health
because they did not have pre-existing paraplegia
[14]. But interestingly, the same subjects gave
lower priority to patients who would experience
the onset of paraplegia after having their lives
saved. And respondents are not completely in-
sensitive to the size of the health gain: for example,
Abellan-Perpi *nan and Pinto-Prades found that
the smaller the size of the beneﬁt to one patient,
the more likely people were to maximise health
gain [15].
In addition, the ﬁnal health state is also
important, particularly in the context of a patient
who cannot be returned to full health after
treatment [16,17]. Roberts and colleagues found
little support for programmes that provided a
prognostic improvement but left patients in
relatively poorer states of health [18]. Dolan and
Green found that many respondents favoured
treating those patients with most to gain, see-
mingly on the grounds that the health state the
worse-oﬀ would be in after treatment was not
suﬃciently good enough to warrant giving them
priority [19]. In relation to life years, Dolan and
Cookson found that people were willing to make
health gain trade-oﬀs between patient groups once
the diﬀerences in the number of life year gained
went beyond a certain threshold [20]. Shmueli
asked respondents to choose between two people:
one who was paralysed and who could be returned
to full health for the rest of their life and one who
would otherwise die but could be given one month
in full health [21]. Sixty-three percent of respon-
dents chose the ﬁrst person. However, when the
question was asked with the second person now
living for ﬁve years with treatment, only 33%
chose the ﬁrst person. It appears, then, that people
may also take account of a threshold level of
health after treatment.
Is social value independent of the age
of the recipient?
Tsuchiya distinguishes three diﬀerent types of
‘ageism’, all of which suggest lower priority for
older people [22]. The ﬁrst favours the young over
the old because they have longer life expectancies,
the second favours young adults over children and
the old because they are more productive, and the
third favours the young over the old because the
old have had more of a share of life years. The ﬁrst
of these is not relevant here, since the issue is
valuing life years (as opposed to whole lives) at
diﬀerent ages. Regarding the second and third
types of ageism, Kappel and Sande argue that the
young should be prioritised for both productivity
and ‘fair innings’ type reasons [23]. That is, other
things being equal, we should favour the young;
either because resources will generally be more
useful when given to young people, or because
they have lived less life and therefore ‘deserve’ the
health improvement.
In developing the ‘fair innings’ argument,
Williams suggests that the expected number of
QALYs a person enjoys over a lifetime should be
taken into account [24]. Williams argues that
there is some amount of quality-adjusted
Table 1 (continued)
Author(s) Year Design Sample Sample size Country of study
Ubel et al. 1996a 2 2 3 2
Ubel et al. 1996b 1 2 4 2
Ubel et al. 1998 2 2 2 2
Ubel et al. 1999a 2 2 3 2
Ubel et al. 1999b 2 2 3 2
Ubel et al. 2000 2 2, 4 3 2
Ubel et al. 2001 1 4 4 2
Verkamp et al. 1998 7 4 3 3
Williams 1988 2 4 2 1
Zweibel et al. 1993 6 1 3 2
Note: Design: 1=postal questionnaire; 2=self-completion questionnaire; 3=structured interview; 4=experiment; 5=focus group
discussion; 6=telephone survey; 7=ethnography. Sample: 1=general public (random/quota); 2=general public (convenience);
3=students or patients; 4=health professionals or academic staﬀ. Sample size: 1=1–29; 2=30–99; 3=100–999; 4=more than
1000. Country of study: 1=UK; 2=US and Canada; 3=Europe; 4=Australia; 5=Other.
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length of life that can be regarded as an
ethical entitlement for everybody. Individuals
receiving less than this amount ‘have in some
sense been cheated’, whilst anyone getting more
than this ‘is living on borrowed time’. However,
Harris (who was one of the ﬁrst to use the term
the ‘fair innings argument’ back in 1985)
maintains that it is not possible to decide who
has had a fair innings without a detailed life
history [25]. But it would seem that there are
strong ethical reasons for the age weighting of
health beneﬁts, and this is something that is
currently being done by the World Health
Organisation in its calculation of disability ad-
justed life years, or DALYs [26].
Three empirical studies support the idea of
treating people of all ages equally. Respondents to
studies by Anand and Wailoo [27], Kuder and
Roeder [28] and Zweibel et al. [29] did not want to
discriminate on the basis of age. However, most
studies suggest that health gains to the old are
weighted less. Respondents to a number of studies
want to give lower priority to older people [30–36].
Browning and Thomas found that the age of a
potential recipient of a donor organ was as
important a consideration as their prognosis [37].
Respondents in a study by Cropper and colleagues
viewed saving one 20 year old as equivalent to
saving seven 60 year olds [38]. The study by
Johannesson and Johannsson produced results
suggesting that saving one 30 year old was
equivalent to saving 35 individuals at the age of
70 years old [39]. Johannesson and Johannsson
report undiscounted weights for life years gained
at ages 30, 50 and 70 of 1.0; 0.22; and 0.1,
respectively [40]. Lewis and Charny show that
respondents have a very strong preference for 5
year olds over 70 year olds, a strong preference for
35 year olds over 60 year olds and a slight
preference for 8 year olds over 2 year olds [41].
Nord and colleagues asked respondents a life-
saving question and found 41.9% wanted to give
patients equal priority; 40.5% wanted to give less
priority to the very old; and 17.6% wanted to give
more priority to the young [42]. They then asked
the same respondents a quality of life question,
and found 75.6% wanted to accord all patients
equal priority; 21.5% wanted to give more to the
young; and 2.9% more to the old. Nord and
colleagues derived weights for ages 10, 20, 60
and 80 of 1.1; 1.0; 0.4 and 0.1 [43]. Busschbach
and colleagues asked people aged around 20 and
people aged around 70 to assign weights for ages 5,
10, 35, 60 and 70, and obtained implied age
weights of 0.2, 1.5, 1.0, 0.7, 0.7, respectively [31].
Replicating this, Tsuchiya found that weights
assigned by the two groups were diﬀerent: for
the young, these were 1.8; 1.6; 1.0; 0.5 and 0.6,
respectively, and for the old, they were 0.6; 0.8;
1.0; 0.5 and 0.3 [35]. Varekamp and colleagues
carried out an enthnographic study of actual
decision-making [44]. This participant observa-
tion of clinicians showed age rationing to be
occurring on the basis of capacity to beneﬁt but
also because of the ‘stage of life’ patients were felt
to be at.
Is social value independent of other
characteristics?
In addition to the assumptions about the linearity
of the parameters in Equation (2), aggregation
methods in CUA usually ignore (or, more
accurately, are neutral towards) any other attri-
butes that may aﬀect the social value attached to
health gains. These additional factors relate to the
causes of the need for treatment and to the wider
consequences from treatment. Society may wish to
take account of the extent to which a person’s ill
health has been caused by factors beyond his
control and the extent to which his ill health is
considered as being determined by his chosen
‘lifestyle’. LeGrand argues that ‘if an individual’s
ill health results from factors beyond his or her
control, then the situation is inequitable; if it
results from factors within his or her control, then
it is equitable’ [45, p. 269]. Similarly, Dolan and
Olsen oﬀer theoretical support for taking
‘responsibility’ into account (but only in very
limited circumstances) [46].
In relation to the consequences from treatment,
Williams argues that the public would discriminate
in favour of people with children over people
without children [36]. Looking at beneﬁts to wider
society, a paper by Labelle and Hurley consider
including externalities derived from interdepen-
dent utility functions [47]. They argue that the level
of interdependent utility associated with a health
intervention will vary depending on the individuals
to whom it is targeted: a QALY will be worth
more than 1.0 for those individuals for whom
society values health improvements more highly.
In addition, there is the possibility that people may
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wish to compensate certain groups for disadvan-
tages they may face in life, and a number of
empirical papers have looked at whether beneﬁts
that go to lower socio-economic groups should be
given greater weight.
There is empirical evidence that some people
(but by no means a clear majority) wish to give less
priority to those who are considered to be in some
way responsible for their ill health [30,36,41,42,48].
In the Gallup Poll in August 1994, 41% of
respondents wanted lower priority for those with
self-inﬂicted illnesses. A survey by the Oﬃce of
Population, Census and Surveys in May–June,
1995 [49] found similar results. Skitka and Tetlock
found that respondents were more likely to deny
aid to those responsible for their predicament [50].
Similarly, Neuberger and colleagues found respon-
dents wanting to give lower priority to patients
waiting for a liver transplant if this was caused by
alcoholic liver disease [51]. Ubel and colleagues
observe that even when drug users had a better
transplant prognosis than any other patient,
respondents only gave them 33% of available
organs [52]. In the same study, smokers received
36% of the organs.
Ubel and colleagues note that in response to
these questions respondents who had never
smoked discriminated the most, and those who
were current smokers discriminated the least [53].
Furnham and colleagues found that, in individual
interviews followed by focus group discussions,
respondents generally favoured non-smokers [54].
Dolan and Tsuchiya found that respondents
wanted to give people who have not cared for
their own health about half as much weight as
those who have cared for their health, and
respondents were generally unwilling to reduce
inequalities in health that were due to smoking
behaviour [55]. However, whilst Dolan and
colleagues found that many people were in favour
of discriminating against those whose ill health is
considered to be partly self-inﬂicted, this view
provoked considerable discussion and dissent [56]
(see also [20]). And contrary to many of the results
above, Edwards and colleagues found that a clear
majority of people did not want to take
‘responsibility’ into account [57].
There is also evidence that people may not
be neutral to the non-health consequences of
treatment. For example, a person who has
family or friends who are dependent upon them
might be given priority over someone else that
does not. There is evidence that people wish to
discriminate in favour of those with dependents,
particularly young children [32,36,37,51,56,58].
Edwards and colleagues present an exception to
this general consensus, and found that respondents
did not want to prioritise those with dependents
[57]. In terms of gender, Dolan and colleagues
presented respondents with a series of trade-oﬀ
questions in relation to diﬀerences in life expec-
tancy and found that, when the diﬀerences
were between men and women, the median
preference was not to target those with lower
average life expectancy (i.e. men) [59]. Using racial
groups, Ubel and colleagues found respondents
less willing to maximise beneﬁts because of the
desire to positively discriminate minority racial
groups [60].
A number of studies have looked at socio-
economic status. Respondents to Anand and
Wailoo’s survey did not discriminate on the basis
of social class (i.e. they did not wish to target the
worse oﬀ) [27]. In the context of focus group
discussions, respondents to Block and colleagues
mentioned a range of beneﬁts other than health
gain, but equity was rarely mentioned and only
2% wanted to prioritise poorer patients [61].
Charny and colleagues report that 21.5% of
respondents preferred a director to an unskilled
worker; 28.5% an unskilled worker to a director;
34.5% a teacher to a lorry driver; and 15.2%
a lorry driver to a teacher, but about 50% of
people did not want to discriminate on the basis of
job title [32]. Dolan and colleagues found that
after discussion, 23% of respondents wanted lower
priority for the rich and 8% wanted higher priority
for those with lower educational attainment [56].
Holmes presented the same questions on mobility
and speech dysfunction as before and reported
values for mobility dysfunction of 0.57 for blue-
collar workers and 0.66 for white-collar workers,
and, for speech, values of 0.65 and 0.62, respec-
tively [58]. In a study by Mooney and colleagues,
41.3% of respondents chose to prioritise the lower
social class [33].
Is social value una¡ected by
inequalities in health?
Culyer and Wagstaﬀ have argued that equality of
health is one of the most important objectives of
health care [62]. Economists have used the social
welfare function (SWF) to consider the trade-oﬀ
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between maximising health and equalising health
[63]. The SWF accounts for both inequalities in
health and the absolute health status of indivi-
duals, as the level of social welfare decreases with
inequalities in health and increases with the health
of individuals. In addition, social welfare depends
on the degree of society’s aversion to inequalities
in health, and on the relative weights attached to
the health of diﬀerent groups or individuals.
Johannesson proposes ‘equity-weighted QALYs’,
where relative changes in QALYs receive the same
weight for all individuals controlling for age and
sex [64]. If the objective is to reduce inequalities in
future health, it follows that QALY gains should
be distributed initially to those who can expect the
worst prospective health if they are left untreated.
It might also be desirable to take into account the
number of QALYs that a person has experienced
up to the decision point, for instance, in terms of
reducing inequalities in lifetime health (see the
discussion of the ‘fair-innings’ argument above).
Further to this, Dolan and Olsen put the concerns
for severity and for age weighting in a more
complete analytical framework that distinguishes
between QALYs gained as a result of past health
care and those gained ‘free’ of health care [46].
Lindholm and colleagues have measured peo-
ple’s preferences regarding inequalities in health by
using diﬀerences in health that exist by socio-
economic status. Lindholm and Rosen found that
given a choice between two programmes (one
which is more eﬀective but does not eliminate
inequality and the other which is less eﬀective but
eliminates inequality), Swedish politicians are
prepared to sacriﬁce 15 of 100 preventable deaths
to achieve equity in death rates between blue and
white-collar workers [65]. Lindholm and collea-
gues report that 27 out of 48 respondents prefer
the programme targeted at the blue-collar workers
[66]. Emmelin and colleagues observe that 12.2%
of respondents want to direct the programme
at the socially disadvantaged [67]. However,
Lindholm and colleagues observe that these
respondents want to equalise outcomes up to a
threshold [68] and another study reports a median
willingness to sacriﬁce eﬃciency at 15% of health
gains [69].
Dolan and colleagues presented respondents
with diﬀerences in life expectancy by social class,
and asked them to choose between maximising
health and targeting beneﬁts on the lowest social
class (but with lower overall health gains as a
result) [59]. The median response in this study was
to be indiﬀerent between a state of the world where
people in the highest and lowest social classes live,
on average, to be 80 and 75 and another state of
the world where these groups live, on average, to
be 78 and 75.5, respectively. In a second question,
presenting diﬀerences in rates of limiting long-term
illness between social classes one and ﬁve, the
median respondent was indiﬀerent between a
decrease in the rate of long-term illness of 7%
for both groups and a 2% and 8% reduction. The
paper goes on to calculate the implied weights at
the initial point, and reports a given gain in life
expectancy to the lowest social class to be weighted
(by the median respondent) about seven times as
highly as an equivalent gain to the highest social
class; and a given reduction in long-term illness to
be weighted about four times as highly.
In general, the literature is indicative
of a general preference for reducing health
inequalities – but not at all costs. Andersson and
Lyttkens observe that the degree of inequality
matters – inﬂuenced by the cost in terms of
reduced life expectancy for the more fortunate
[70]. Johannesson and Gerdtham report a will-
ingness to sacriﬁce one QALY to the better oﬀ to
give 0.45 QALYs to the worse oﬀ [71]. Dolan and
Robinson report inequality neutrality in one study
and inequality aversion in the other, and attribute
the diﬀerence to the eﬀect of loss aversion (i.e.
people are reluctant to take beneﬁts away from
one person to give them to someone else) [72]. In a
study by Cuadras-Morato and colleagues the
majority of respondents chose to allocate resources
such that diﬀerences between ﬁnal health states is
the same for each patient [73].
Is social value independent of how a
¢xed gain is distributed?
The QALY maximisation model is indiﬀerent
between a large beneﬁt to the few and a small
beneﬁt to the many, provided that the overall
beneﬁts are of equal magnitude. But people may
have preferences in favour of one over the other.
Olsen suggests that this preference will be aﬀected
by four considerations: positive time preference,
threshold eﬀects, risk aversion, and ‘pure’ equity
preferences [74]. He notes that time preferences
and equity preferences would take respondents in
the direction of distributing beneﬁts as widely as
possible. If the smaller gain is below a certain
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threshold, or people are risk averse, this may take
them in the reverse direction i.e. they may prefer to
concentrate the health gains to a few.
There is evidence that people are not indiﬀerent
to the distribution of the same total gain over
populations of diﬀerent sizes. Choudhry and
colleagues found that one half of respondents
choose to provide a large increase in life expec-
tancy to the few and about one ﬁfth preferred a
small increase in life expectancy for the many [75].
Olsen also found that a majority of respondents
were not indiﬀerent between two distributions with
the same total gain, although a much smaller
percentage preferred to concentrate beneﬁts [74].
He suggests that there is a threshold level of
beneﬁts to the larger group above which people
prefer to distribute gains to as many people as
possible but below which they prefer to concen-
trate gains (also see [76]). This is reiterated by
Rodr!ıguez Miguez and Pinto-Prades who found
that participants, on average, prefer health pro-
grammes that distribute beneﬁts over a greater
number of people, provided that the gain to each
patient is suﬃciently high, and who report this
threshold gain to be over nine years [77]. There is
also evidence that people have a strong preference
for giving everyone a beneﬁt, if this is possible. In a
choice between two screening programmes, Ubel
and colleagues found that one half of respondents
preferred the programme which could prevent
fewer deaths but which could be oﬀered to all
citizens [78]. However, in a follow up study, Ubel
and colleagues found that many fewer respondents
held this preference when neither screening pro-
gramme could be oﬀered to everyone [79].
Discussion
This review has shown that an increasing number
of studies are looking at the descriptive validity of
the QALY maximisation rule. In relation to the
linear additivity of quality and length of life, there
seems to be a diminishing marginal social value
associated with changes in both Q and T.
However, very few of the studies have properly
controlled for the possibility that people’s prefer-
ences may have been contaminated by the belief
that there is a diminishing marginal value to
incremental health beneﬁts. Some studies focusing
on quality of life, like that of Nord [5] and Dolan
[9], have explicitly told respondents that the more
severely ill patients will gain less beneﬁt from
treatment than the less severely ill patients, but
more could be done in future studies to get
respondents to really appreciate the interval
properties of health state valuation scales. For
example, respondents could be asked to identify
two treatments that they consider to bring about
the same individual beneﬁt but which start and
ﬁnish at diﬀerent points on the valuation range.
Only then would they be asked to consider the
social value of these treatments. This is somewhat
similar to the design adopted by Dolan and Green
[19]. In a similar way, studies that have looked at
the linear additivity of life years might have been
contaminated by decreasing marginal utility of life
years, and possibly even by positive time pre-
ference. So, again, future studies should ﬁrst seek
to establish that the duration of individual beneﬁts
are considered identical before proceeding to the
evaluation of social beneﬁts.
In relation to the value of life years at diﬀerent
ages, there have been some studies that suggest
that all ages should be treated equally but the
majority of the empirical evidence is supportive of
giving lesser weight to older people. Whilst
perceived diﬀerences in productivity across age
groups alone are unlikely to have explained the
results in these studies, it is often diﬃcult to tell
how much of the preference for the young is due to
the beneﬁts to the young being greater (or being
perceived to be greater) and how much is due to
the young having lived for less time. The former
explanation is consistent with the QALY max-
imisation rule while the latter is consistent with the
‘fair innings’ argument. One possible way to do
control for health beneﬁts might be to ask
respondents to compare diﬀerent ages when the
beneﬁts do diﬀer, and then to ask them the same
question when the beneﬁts are the same; in this
way, the diﬀerence between what they are being
asked to do and what they might naturally do (i.e.
answer in a way consistent with the ﬁrst question)
is made explicit (see [80]).
Regarding the importance of other characteris-
tics, there is some evidence to support the view
that people who are considered to be responsible
for their ill health should be given lower priority,
but this is never a majority view, and it is certainly
an issue that generates much controversy. There is
a greater consensus, insofar as there is majority
support, for the idea that we should discriminate
in favour of those with dependants. The evidence
pertaining to peoples’ preferences about inequal-
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ities in health suggests that there is a clear
preference for reducing inequalities in health when
they are described according to socio-economic
status, but no real desire to when they are
described according to gender. Finally, in terms
of the questions addressed in this review, there is
evidence that people are not indiﬀerent concerning
the distribution of a ﬁxed beneﬁt. Generally, they
prefer to disperse beneﬁts as widely as possible
but, if the beneﬁts going to any one individual are
considered to be too small, they prefer to
concentrate beneﬁts amongst fewer people instead.
The possibility of threshold eﬀects – where health
beneﬁts and/or the ﬁnal level of health are
considered to be too small to give priority to –
seem to be pervasive amongst many of the studies
reported here (e.g. also in relation to the linearity
additivity of Q and T), and so it really is important
that empirical research is directed at this issue.
Overall, many empirical studies have been
undertaken to look at the societal value of health
gains. Most of these studies have used relatively
small samples and, to enhance the policy useful-
ness of the results, we would welcome more large-
scale general population studies. However, given
that people’s preferences are partly constructed
during the process of elicitation, such studies must
also make some attempts to ‘get behind the
numbers’ so that we can be much clearer than
hitherto about what preferences are the result of
concerns for equity and what are the result of
extraneous factors. It has not been possible from
this review to draw any real conclusions about the
weight given to these considerations relative to one
another. This is because respondents have typi-
cally been asked to weigh only one factor at a time
against health gain and have rarely been asked to
consider more than one factor simultaneously.
Moreover, very few studies have actually tried to
estimate weights for those factors that a simple
QALY maximisation rule might be traded-oﬀ
against. Therefore, our main recommendation
would be for a coherent research programme that
attempted to provide some very general conclu-
sions about the relative importance of various key
factors and then perhaps to elicit some general
weights for them.
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